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Abstract 
According to some philosophers, gender is a social role or pattern of 
behavior in a social context. I argue that these accounts have problematic 
implications for transgender. I suggest that gender is a complex behavioral 
disposition, or cluster of dispositions. Furthermore, since gender norms 
are culturally relative, one’s gender is partially constituted by extrinsic 
factors. I argue that this has advantages over thinking of gender as 
behavior, and has the added advantage of accommodating the possibility 
of an appearance/reality dissonance with respect to one’s gender. 
Keywords: Feminism, Gender, Gender identity, Gender dysphoria, 
Transgender 
1 Introduction 
This paper argues that one’s gender is partially constituted by extrin-
sic factors. In Sect. 2, I very briefly explain my understanding of sex, 
gender, and transgender. In Sect. 3, a survey recent accounts of gen-
der as a socially constructed or conferred property, ending with Ju-
dith Butler’s idea that gender is a pattern of behavior in a social con-
text. In Sect. 4, I suggest a modification of Butler’s idea, according to 
which gender is a behavioral disposition. In Sect. 5, I develop my dis-
positional account by responding to a worry that it is too essential-
ist. In Sect. 6, I defend my claim that gender is relational. In Sect. 7, I 
consider and reply to four further objections. 
digitalcommons.unl.edu
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2 Sex, gender, and transgender 
Gender is not sex, and is not determined by sex. In my view, an or-
ganism’s sex is a biological property, concerning which type of gam-
etes it is supposed to produce in a reproductive process.1 The term 
‘‘gender’’ as it is typically used in feminist theory, refers to a psycho-
social property. Traditionally, sexes include male and female, while 
genders include masculine, feminine, man, and woman. Transgender 
is a clear indication of the non-co-extensiveness of sex and gender. 
For example, some biologically female human beings do not identi-
fy as women, do not play a feminine gender role, and are not called 
‘‘women.’’ One’s sex may have some causal influence on one’s gen-
der, but it is not always decisive or definitive. Transgender individu-
als sometimes experience gender dysphoria—the phenomenon of se-
vere discomfort with one’s assigned gender—an assignment which is 
typically based on one’s biological sex. 
3 Accounts of gender 
If gender is not sex, what is it? Or, as Simone de Beauvoir asked in 
1949: 
If her functioning as a female is not enough to define 
woman, if we decline also to explain her through ‘the eter-
nal feminine’, and if nevertheless we admit, provisional-
ly, that women do exist, then we must face the question 
‘what is a woman’?2 
In the intervening 65 years, many answers have been offered. I will 
not present a representative survey, but I will mention a few accounts 
to set the stage for my own approach. 
On Charlotte Witt’s view, genders are social positions with bifur-
cated social norms that cluster around a socially mediated reproduc-
tive function.3 According to Sally Haslanger: 
1 While defense of this assumption is beyond the scope of this paper, I acknowl-
edge that it is not uncontroversial. Sveinsdóttir (2011) argues that, in addition 
to gender, sex is also socially conferred. Butler (2006) can be interpreted as ar-
guing that there is no physical reality to sex. Dreger (1998) and Fausto-Sterling 
(2000) argue that the biological story is more complicated than the male/fe-
male binary suggests. 
2 Beauvoir (1989), p. xxi). 
3 Witt (2011, pp. 32, 40). 
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S is a woman iff 
S is systematically subordinated along some dimension 
(economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and 
S is marked as a target for this treatment by observed or 
imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a 
female’s biological role in reproduction.4 
On Ásta Sveinsdóttir’s view, gender is a property conferred on a sub-
ject in a social context, where those doing the conferring are attempt-
ing to track some grounding property, such as role in biological repro-
duction, societal organization of various kinds, sexual engagement, 
presentation of the body, in the preparation of food, etc.5 
I think all of these approaches are helpful when thinking of the so-
cial aspects of gender. However, these definitions lack any mention of 
the subjective or psychological aspects of gender. On these accounts, 
your gender is a matter of how you are regarded and treated by oth-
ers, not how you regard yourself. So, it is not clear what these ac-
counts can say about the gender dysphoric who suffers in silence, or 
the claims of a closeted transgender individual who has a male body, 
is playing a masculine social role, and is thought to be a man, but 
who says to herself ‘‘I’m really a woman.’’ On Haslanger’s account, a 
desire to be regarded as a woman is a desire to be targeted for sub-
ordination. It seems that such desires should only be attributed to 
people who are deluded or confused about what is in their self-inter-
est. If this does not seem right, perhaps another distinction is need-
ed. In addition to distinguishing gender from sex, we need to distin-
guish gender role and gender identity. With this distinction in mind, 
it seems fair to say that the accounts of Haslanger, Witt and Ásta are 
accounts of gender role, not gender identity. To that end, they are not 
well-equipped to shed light on gender dysphoria. That is not an ob-
jection to such accounts, but an attempt to clarify my shift of focus 
to a related but importantly different object of analysis—from gender 
role to gender identity. 
One approach that I think does more to connect the social with the 
subjective is that of Judith Butler. On Butler’s view, gender is a pat-
tern of behavior in a social context. In Gender Trouble Butler offers 
a performative account of gender.6 Performative utterances or illo-
cutions are speech acts that, loosely speaking, make something so, 
as ‘‘I now pronounce you man and wife,’’ said by the right person in 
4 Haslanger (2000). 
5 Sveinsdóttir (2011, p. 61). 
6 Butler (2006). 
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the right circumstances, makes it the case that a couple is married. 
A speech act being an illocution is not merely a matter of its effects. 
What is special about illocutions is that, in the right circumstances, 
their utterance is sufficient for a state of affairs to obtain. You’re boss 
saying ‘‘you’re fired’’ does not cause you to be fired; it constitutes 
your being fired. Performatives can include non-verbal behaviors as 
well, such as slipping on a ring or stepping on a glass. 
To say that gender is performative is to say that one is masculine 
or feminine in virtue of behaving in certain ways in a certain context, 
just as one is ‘‘under oath’’ in virtue of behaving a certain ways in a 
certain context. However, unlike most performative utterances, for 
gender, a single act will not suffice. As Butler stresses, ‘‘doing gen-
der’’ is a matter of repeated patterns of behavior, regulated by sanc-
tions and prohibitions. According to Butler, patterns of dress, posture, 
and speech are not expressions of an inner gender identity, but are in-
stead constitutive of being gendered. By exhibiting a certain pattern of 
behavior, one thereby makes it so that one is feminine or masculine. 
Because your behavior is shaped by a myriad of forces, you do 
not have complete control over your gender. Furthermore, how your 
behavior is interpreted genderwise is largely out of your control as 
well. As Butler puts it: ‘‘what gender ‘is,’ is always relative to the con-
structed relations in which it is determined.’’7 This fact ties in with 
another feature of illocutions—they depend on power. As Rae Lang-
ton points out, for a person to succeed in making an illocution, she 
must not only produce certain sounds, but must also have the au-
thority to ordain into being the state of affairs of which she speaks.8 
A priest, government official, or employer has the power to marry, 
arrest, or promote, and so their words count as marrying, arresting, 
or promoting. Even in the case of a layperson’s promises, oaths, and 
pledges, one must have the autonomy to commit oneself. In contrast, 
the vocalizations of a toddler or a parrot do not count as giving con-
sent. But even in situations where an authority has the power to do 
things by making pronouncements, he does not have limitless power. 
He cannot say anything he pleases and have that count as a marrying 
or promoting. What words or actions accomplish the deed depend on 
social conventions that are beyond the complete control of any indi-
vidual authority. 
In the case of gender, saying ‘‘I’m a girl’’ does not necessarily make 
it so, and only certain behaviors will count towards establishing a 
7 Butler (2006, p. 14). 
8 Langton (1997). 
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feminine gender identity. The complex and extensive patterns of be-
havior that allow one to pass as a woman are socially sanctioned, and 
socially relative. In Butler, as with other feminist theorist,9 we find 
reasons to think that your gender is not just about you; it is not an 
entirely intrinsic matter. Nevertheless, on Butler’s account, your gen-
der is still about you, since the behavior that constitutes your gender 
at the same time constructs your identity. 
However, similar to the accounts of gender mentioned above, it is 
not clear what Butler’s account can say about gender dysphoria. It 
seems that someone who exhibits gender stereotypical behavior has 
that gender, on her view, regardless of how they feel about it. Ironi-
cally, on her account, the source of rebellion against gender norms, or 
‘‘gender trouble,’’ is quite mysterious. There is no inner, other-gen-
dered self to conflict with one’s socially sanctioned gender role. 
4 From behaviors to dispositions 
Another concern I have about Butler’s account is that patterns of 
behavior do not seem to be quite the right gender-making entities. 
There are times when men and women are not engaging in any gen-
dered behavior. Sometimes they are not behaving at all, or they are 
behaving in ways that are not gender-specific. But they do not, at 
those times, cease to be gendered. I would further argue that one 
could be feminine while exhibiting patterns of masculine behavior 
for extended periods of time, and vice versa. Others could be mis-
taken in basing their gender attributions of others on their observed 
behavior. For such reasons, I think it is better to think of genders as 
dispositions to behave in certain ways, dispositions which are not al-
ways manifest. Being gendered is not exclusively a matter of how one 
is actually behaving currently, but also a matter of how one is dis-
posed to behave. These dispositions can be masked, or overpowered 
by other dispositions—dispositions to bow to social pressure, or pur-
sue incompatible goals. 
In order to explain the idea that genders are dispositions, I need 
to say a few words about how I am thinking about dispositions. 
When someone has a disposition, he or she is prone to act in certain 
ways in certain circumstances. A cowardly person is disposed to 
flee from danger. A sociable person is disposed to seek the compa-
ny of others. Physical objects also have dispositions. Fragile objects 
9 Haslanger (2000). 
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are disposed to break when struck. Elastic objects are disposed to 
stretch when pulled. Numerous synonyms and near-synonyms in-
clude ‘‘power,’’ ‘‘ability,’’ ‘‘capacity,’’ ‘‘tendency,’’ and ‘‘potentiali-
ty.’’ A disposition has a characteristic manifestation. For example, 
the characteristic manifestation of fragility is shattering, and the 
characteristic manifestation of cowardliness is avoidance of dan-
ger. The manifestation need not occur for the object to have the dis-
position. A glass can be fragile even if it never shatters. A manifes-
tation of a disposition occurs (at least typically) when the object 
with the disposition is subject to certain circumstances. The fragile 
glass shatters when it is struck. These ‘‘circumstances of manifes-
tation’’ include not only the salient ‘‘trigger’’ for the manifestation 
(the striking), but also the necessary background conditions, such 
as ambient temperature and gravitational forces. 
Given that a disposition is associated with a manifestation, and 
with circumstances which trigger the occurrence of this manifesta-
tion, there is a natural association between a statement attributing 
a disposition to a thing and a certain conditional statement: If the 
conditions were to obtain, the manifestation would occur. For exam-
ple, the statement ‘‘This glass is fragile’’ bears some important rela-
tion to the statement ‘‘If this glass were struck, it would shatter.’’ An 
attribution of a disposition to some object licenses inferences about 
what will happen in various circumstances. These inferences may be 
defeasible, but the ability to make these inferences is what makes 
dispositions talk so useful, if not indispensable. We frequently have 
pressing reasons to be concerned about predicting what things will 
do in various circumstances. It is important to know what is poison-
ous and what is nutritious, which animals are aggressive, and which 
situations are dangerous. We are interested to predict the behavior 
of other human beings, and so describe them as friendly, hostile, ir-
ritable, shy, ambitious, trust-worthy, and so on. Disposition ascrip-
tions are an important means of communicating our understanding 
of what to expect from the things in our environment. 
This characterization suggests certain ‘‘marks of dispositionality,’’ 
according to which a property is a disposition if it: 
(1) has a characteristic manifestation; 
(2) is such that certain circumstances can trigger that 
manifestation; 
(3) can be possessed without the manifestation occurring; 
(4) is instantiated by things of which a conditional of the form 
‘‘if it were subject to the circumstances, it would exhibit the 
manifestation’’ is generally true; and 
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(5) can be accurately characterized with an expression of the 
form ‘‘the disposition to produce the manifestation in the 
circumstances.’’10 
In my view, these conditions are jointly sufficient for dispositionality, 
but not individually necessary. These marks of dispositionality char-
acterize the concept, but do not constitute a reductive analysis. 
If a gender is a disposition, it is a massively multi-track disposi-
tion, with many different characteristic manifestations (aggression, 
saying that you are a boy, playing with certain kinds of toys, dressing 
and grooming in certain ways, pursuing certain careers or life plans, 
etc.). Alternatively, gender can be thought of as a cluster of disposi-
tions. These dispositions toward gendered behavior are triggered by 
certain circumstances (shopping for clothes, getting a haircut, being 
insulted, being asked what you want for Christmas, registering for 
classes, etc.). These dispositions can be possessed without manifest-
ing, since people are not always in circumstances of manifestation for 
gendered behavior, and like other dispositions, gender dispositions 
can be masked, inhibited, and mimicked. Furthermore, certain coun-
terfactuals will typically be true of the gendered person, such as ‘‘If 
someone asked him whether he is a boy or a girl, he would say that 
he is a boy.’’ Granted, we typically do not characterize gender terms 
with dispositional expressions. However, if a gender is a cluster of 
dispositions, many of the dispositions in the cluster will be accurate-
ly characterizable by dispositional expressions, such as ‘the disposi-
tion to blush when complimented,’ for example. 
5 Objection to potential essentialist implications and further 
explication 
When I say that to have a certain gender is to have certain disposi-
tions, an advocate for Butler’s view might object I am re-internaliz-
ing gender to an unacceptable extent. One of the features of Butler’s 
view that many (including myself) find attractive is that it offers an 
alternative to a conception of gender as an essential, innate truth 
about a person and gendered behavior as an outward expression of 
an inner gendered self. Butler turns this notion on its head and con-
strues this inner self as a consequence of, or a construction out of, 
these behaviors rather than their cause. The objection can be put as 
follows: 
10 McKitrick (2003). 
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Suggesting that these behaviors are manifestations of the 
individual’s dispositions threatens to restore the caus-
al order that Butler so effectively rejected. It would sug-
gest, for instance, that women typically behave in femi-
nine ways because of their essential innate dispositions 
to do so. 
However, I do not think my suggestion is as antithetical to But-
ler’s view as it may seem. For starters, saying ‘‘to be feminine is to 
be disposed to behave in certain ways’’ says nothing about the ori-
gin, strength, or stability of that disposition. It is consistent with my 
approach that dispositions for gendered behavior are products of so-
cialization, are had in varying degrees of intensity, and could change 
over time. 
Moreover, thinking of gender as dispositional makes better sense 
of Butler’s claims about the role of social conditioning than her own 
performative view does. Butler stresses that gendered patterns of be-
havior are socially conditioned by means of sanctions and prohibi-
tions. Imagining how that conditioning is supposed to work demon-
strates the need for dispositions. Suppose a range of behaviors are 
exhibited in an arbitrary, random fashion. If socialization is to hone 
that repertoire, it rewards desired behaviors and punishes undesired 
behaviors to increase the production of desired behaviors and de-
crease the production of the undesired ones in the future. But that is 
to make the subject of socialization more prone, that is, more highly 
disposed, to behave in certain ways in the future, and to weaken their 
dispositions to behave in other ways. 
Furthermore, we need not, and I would argue we should not, think 
of these dispositions as intrinsic properties. Dispositions, like oth-
er properties, can be relational or extrinsic, and are extrinsic when 
perfect duplicates can differ with respect to them. I have argued that 
properties like weight, visibility, and vulnerability, are extrinsic dis-
positions.11 A perfect duplicate of me would weigh less on the moon, 
be less visible in the dark, and more vulnerable in Syria. 
Gender is apt for being treated as relational, since standards of 
masculinity and femininity vary across cultures, races, classes and 
over time. For example, masculinity has classically been associat-
ed with the mind, and femininity with the body. But these associa-
tions do not take account of the intersection of gender and class; they 
do hold up in a working-class culture that derides the bookworm 
11 McKitrick (2003). 
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schoolboy as a sissy and extolls feats of physical strength, and hearty 
enjoyment of food and drink as manly. Wearing what might be con-
sidered a floral skirt seems feminine, unless it is a sign of affilia-
tion with a Hawaiian street gang. Being a competitive, politically ac-
tive college professor and household breadwinner sporting pants and 
short hair would have been considered a very masculine pattern of 
behavior a century ago, but in many cultures today, such behavior is 
taken to be perfectly compatible with being feminine. 
The idea that being gendered is a matter of having certain disposi-
tions could be put more formally as follows: 
x is gender G iff 
x has (sufficiently many, sufficiently strong) dispositions 
D1…Dn
 to behave in ways B1…Bn
 in situations S1…Sn, and 
The relevant social group considers behaving in ways B1…
Bn
 in situations S1…Sn
 to be G. 
The relevant behaviors could include modes of dress, posture and 
mannerisms, productive and leisure time activities, styles of commu-
nication and social interaction. Behavioral dispositions correspond to 
different kinds of psychological characteristics, such habits, respons-
es to incentives, and experienced desires. Candidates for gender G in-
clude ‘masculine,’ ‘feminine,’ ‘trans,’ ‘queer,’ etc. Since the relevance 
of a social group is relative to context, one’s gender will be relative to 
context, and consequently extrinsic. 
On this view, one can have multiple genders, and one can have 
different genders in different contexts. The expression ‘‘sufficiently 
strong, sufficiently many’’ is deliberately vague. Having any particu-
lar gender is a matter of degree, and there are no particular disposi-
tions which are necessary for being a certain gender. Another conse-
quence of this view is that a social group can be wrong about a person’s 
gender if its members do not know enough about that person’s be-
havioral dispositions. This happens when a social group makes false 
assumptions about a person’s behavioral dispositions based on their 
physical appearance or past behavior. Sometimes, many of an indi-
vidual’s behavioral dispositions are not manifest, because these dis-
positions are masked or counteracted. It is a virtue of this account 
that it is possible for there to be a discrepancy between the appear-
ance and the reality of one’s gender. 
A more controversial implication of this view is that it is theo-
retically possible a person can be wrong about their own gender. In 
general, it is possible for a person to be mistaken about their own 
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behavioral dispositions. I might think that I have a disposition to 
write a book, given the circumstances of having enough free time, 
but then I find that having free time does not trigger any book-writ-
ing behavior. Alternatively, a person might be disposed towards some 
behavioral repertoire, and think that those behaviors are considered 
‘‘G’’ in the relevant social context, but be wrong about that. This pos-
sibility is implicitly acknowledged by the standard of care for trans-
gender patients. Before engaging in any physically-altering therapies 
such as hormones or surgery, it is recommended that the patient ‘‘has 
demonstrated a long-lasting and intense pattern of gender noncon-
formity or gender dysphoria.’’12 The expressed purpose of this mea-
sure is to ensure that the individual is correct about their own gen-
der identity before they make any irreversible changes to their body. 
Whether someone could wrong about their own gender depends, 
in part, on the gender norms of the relevant social group. If the rele-
vant social group takes self-identification be to definitive, then one’s 
declaration of their gender is automatically true in that social con-
text. But if the social group takes other behaviors to be relevant, and 
if behavioral dispositions are experienced as desires, impulses and 
emotions, an individual would be in the best position to know if they 
have those dispositions. It is unlikely that a person could have suffi-
ciently many sufficiently strong dispositions to behave as a woman 
and yet remain ignorant of that fact. 
6 Objections to extrinsicness 
One may object that dispositions to act in gender-specific ways are not 
extrinsic dispositions. One might argue instead that a gendered person 
has intrinsic dispositions to behave in certain ways and the only ex-
trinsic factor is the social group that interprets that behavior gender-
wise. Granted, it is not uncontroversial or obvious that these are exam-
ples of extrinsic dispositions. The objector might elaborate as follows: 
Suppose I am disposed to wear skirts. The manifesta-
tion of my disposition to wear skirts is the procurement 
and donning of a skirt. If some perfect duplicate of me 
were in some possible culture where the wearing of skirts 
was considered masculine, that wouldn’t make my dispo-
sition to wear skirts an extrinsic disposition. The social 
12 The World Professional Association for Transgender Health (2012, p. 19). 
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judgment that my behavior is feminine seems to be af-
ter the fact of my having and manifesting a disposition 
to wear skirts. And insofar as my gender is a matter of 
my having such intrinsic dispositions, it would seem as 
though my disposition for gendered behavior is intrinsic. 
Likewise, being on fire might be considered a danger in 
some circumstances and a welcome source of heat in oth-
ers, but that would not make ‘being flammable’ extrinsic. 
Responding to this objection requires a reconsideration of the 
ways a disposition can be extrinsic. Perhaps, if a property is extrinsic, 
then a disposition to instantiate that property is an extrinsic disposi-
tion. If ‘x having property P’ depends on things other than x, then ‘x 
being disposed to have property P’ would also depend on things other 
than x. In that case, the disposition would be extrinsic. Being some-
one who makes people laugh is an extrinsic property, so the ability 
or disposition to make others laugh must be extrinsic too. Perfect du-
plicates could differ with respect to an ability to make others laugh—
given that the ‘‘others’’ refers to different social groups with different 
senses of humor. A person can be considered likable in some social 
contexts but not others. Another way for a disposition to be extrin-
sic is if the manifestation of that disposition is a matter of becoming 
a member of a kind, where membership in that kind is socially deter-
mined. For example, a book can have a disposition to be a best-seller 
in some markets, but not others. Someone might be disposed to em-
igrate from a country, but whether they are thereby disposed to be 
a refugee depends on whether their emigrating would result in their 
being included in the socially determined class of refugees. 
As an example of how a thing’s intrinsic and extrinsic disposi-
tions can be related, consider the dispositions of a traffic light. It 
has a certain structure and functionality so that it emits certain 
electromagnetic radiation in certain circumstances. Perhaps a per-
fect duplicate of that traffic light would emit the same kind of radi-
ation given the same stimulus. But not every possible duplicate traf-
fic light is disposed to cause red visual experiences in the minds of 
local perceivers, nor would it be disposed cause certain perceivers 
to perform certain actions in order to decelerate their momentum. 
Even if a traffic light has some intrinsic dispositions, its disposition 
to cause drivers to step on the brakes depends on it being embed-
ded in a system which includes perceivers with a certain visual sys-
tem, who have certain conventions for regulating their behavior for 
social coordination, and established interconnected mechanisms to 
facilitate that coordination. 
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Now consider the disposition for gendered behavior. Its manifesta-
tion is gendered behavior—acting in a feminine way for example. But 
what counts as feminine behavior, and what counts as gendered for 
that matter, is socially determined. Some people are disposed to push 
around noisy machines for the upkeep of their environment, which 
may not seem to be particularly gender-specific behavior under that 
description. But whether it is a lawnmower or a vacuum cleaner can 
make all the difference as to whether one is performing a mascu-
line social role or a feminine one. When a girl plays with a ‘‘Ken’’ 
doll from her collection of Barbie dolls and a boy plays with a G. I. 
Joe action figure, they are each engaging in behavior deemed appro-
priate for their genders. If we restrict our attention to some narrow 
description of behavior, perhaps down to the level of making certain 
bodily movements, then perhaps perfect physical duplicates agree on 
dispositions to such behaviors, so construed. But gendered behavior 
is behavior under a certain description, in a certain context. 
Furthermore, the fact that certain behaviors count as gendered can 
causally impact the extent to which people are disposed to engage in 
them. A disposition to wear skirts does not occur in a vacuum, but in 
a context of the availability of clothing options, role-models, and so-
cial validation. In recent decades, ‘‘liberated’’ women have been re-
luctant to knit, for example, due to its association with traditional 
femininity, while other women proudly adopt certain modes of dress 
because they are deemed to be expressive of their femininity. Norms 
create feedback loops, whereby being categorized in a certain way 
creates expectations and incentives that can lead one to develop char-
acteristics that justify that very categorization, or they can motivate 
one to shun those characteristics in order to defy that categorization. 
In short, if a behavior is gendered, that is not an intrinsic feature 
of that behavior, and furthermore, its being gendered is socially de-
termined. So, a disposition to exhibit gendered behavior, qua gen-
dered behavior, is a disposition to instantiate a socially determined, 
extrinsic property, and that is reason to think that it is an extrinsic 
disposition. 
At this point, an objector might retort: 
You have made it too easy for a property to be an extrin-
sic disposition. By similar reasoning, color would be an 
extrinsic property of things. Suppose that being red is a 
matter of having a disposition to cause visual experiences 
of a certain qualitative character. But whether that man-
ifestation occurs depends not just on the red thing, but 
the visual system of the perceiver looking at it. Perfect 
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duplicates being looked at by different perceivers can dif-
fer with respect to looking red. But if a dispositional ac-
count of color is objective, whereby it makes sense to say 
that that color-blind person cannot see that the object is 
really red, it must make reference to certain kinds of per-
ceivers, i.e. normal human perceivers. Do not confuse cir-
cumstances of manifestation with circumstances of pos-
session. In order for a red thing to manifest its disposition 
to look red, it has to be in the circumstances of manifes-
tation, and that includes being in the right relation to the 
right kind of perceiver. But those conditions are not nec-
essary in order for a thing to be red. Likewise, being in the 
right social environment might be necessary in order for 
my femininity to be manifest. But that environment is not 
necessary to my being feminine. My perfect duplicate and 
I have the same dispositions to appear feminine to cer-
tain socially situated perceivers. Even if my duplicate is in 
a different environment, we can evaluate her dispositions 
with respect to the effect she would have on the perceiv-
ers in my environment. If she is not seen as feminine in 
her environment, that is just because she is not in the rel-
evant circumstances of manifestation. Since my duplicate 
and I must agree in our dispositions to appear feminine to 
certain socially situated perceivers, the disposition to ap-
pear feminine is intrinsic. 
In response, it is not clear that an appeal to normal perceivers can 
work here. Even in the case of color, it is not uncontroversial that we 
can identify normal perceivers that are part of the circumstances of 
manifestation.13 To extend this strategy to the case of gender would 
amount to saying that there is some class of normal socially situated 
perceivers, and their perceptions of behavior as gendered are deter-
minative of the existence of dispositions to engage in gendered be-
havior. But it is not clear whose social norms we should privilege, or, 
more importantly, why we should do so. 
The objector might respond as follows: 
We do not need to privilege any particular social context 
as the circumstances of manifestation for gender disposi-
tions. We can say, instead, that a person has a disposition 
13 See Brogaard (2009).
McKitrick  in  Philosophical  Studies  172  (2015)       14
to exhibit behavior that is gendered relative to a certain 
context. Perfect duplicates necessarily agree on those dis-
positions, and so they are intrinsic. 
I’m really not sure if my hypothetical interlocutor and I are dis-
agreeing anymore. We agree that the extent to which certain behav-
iors are considered gendered is culturally relative, and that it is pos-
sible that a person could behave in a way that is seen as masculine in 
social context A, but not in social context B. Accordingly, I say that the 
person’s ‘disposition to behave in masculine way’ is extrinsic, while 
my opponent says that the person’s ‘disposition to behave in a mascu-
line way in context A’ is intrinsic. These claims are compatible. I sup-
pose what is at issue is whether our gender concepts make implicit 
reference to a relevant cultural context, as (arguably) our color con-
cepts make implicit reference to relevant perceivers. 
7 Other objections and replies 
(a) This account gives too much power to the relevant so-
cial group in determining one’s gender and does not give 
sufficient deference to self-identification. 
However, gender concepts are social concepts. Gender terms are part 
of a public language. Whether a pattern of behavior is called ‘‘mas-
culine,’’ ‘‘feminine,’’ ‘‘queer,’’ or ‘‘none of the above’’ is a fact about a 
culture and linguistic community. Recall the constraints on success-
ful performatives. Which words or actions counts as marrying or fir-
ing depend on social conventions that are not within the speaker’s 
control. Similarly, whether your society will count your behavior as 
masculine or feminine is largely out of your control. On this view, 
one does not count as feminine relative to a certain social group un-
less one is disposed to behave in ways that are considered feminine 
by that group. 
(b) This account says wrong things about ‘‘man’’ and 
‘‘woman.’’ Some males are effeminate without being 
women. 
In response, recall that gender is a matter of degree on this account. 
Do the effeminate males in question have ‘‘sufficiently many suffi-
ciently strong dispositions’’ to behave in ways that are considered 
womanly by the relevant social group? If not, perhaps the man’s 
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behavior is more toward the feminine end of the spectrum than most 
males in the relevant context, but not so far as to be considered a 
woman. But suppose a male does have sufficiently many, sufficient-
ly strong dispositions to behave in ways that are considered womanly 
by a social group, and you still say it is wrong for people in that social 
group to call that person a woman. Then, I suggest that you are not 
using ‘‘woman’’ as a gender term. Arguably, ‘‘woman’’ in English, is a 
complex concept that has a biological component. Natalie Stoljar ex-
plicates the concept ‘‘woman’’ by first identifying paradigm individu-
als to which the concept applies. She goes on to say: 
These paradigms are members of the class ‘‘woman’’ in 
virtue of a complex and intersecting set of properties such 
as, first, having the biology of a human female body and 
other bodily characteristics such as gait or voice quali-
ty; secondly having certain phenomenological features or 
‘‘lived experiences’’… thirdly, taking on social roles such 
as wearing typical female dress, or undertaking ‘‘private’’ 
responsibilities like child-rearing… and fourthly, calling 
oneself a woman and being called a woman…14 
While some feminist theorists stipulate that the term ‘‘woman’’ is a 
pure gender term whose use is independent of biological sex, oth-
er judgments about when the term ‘‘woman’’ is applicable are in-
formed by ‘‘observed or imagined bodily features.’’15 
(c) This account does not distinguish genders from other 
behavioral dispositions. Someone could be disposed to 
engage in a range of behaviors in various circumstances, 
and thereby be considered brave or shy. But bravery and 
shyness are not genders. 
It is worth noting that other accounts have this feature. On But-
ler’s account, certain patterns of behavior in certain contexts make it 
the case that one is a woman. And presumably, other patterns of be-
havior in other contexts could make it the case that you are brave. If 
there is something special about some patterns of behavior that make 
them genders, Butler does not specify. Likewise with Asta’s account. 
Suppose a property is conferred on a subject in the social context of a 
14 Stoljar (2011). 
15 Haslanger (2000). 
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restaurant, where those doing the conferring are attempting to track 
the grounding property of skill in the preparation of food. This fits 
Asta’s schema of conferring a gender property. But for all that has 
been said, the property conferred is being a chef, and being a chef is 
not a gender. 
That being said, perhaps this feature could be avoided by amend-
ing the account. For one thing, unlike being brave, shy, or a chef, gen-
ders include extensive and pervasive behavioral repertoires, so much 
so that Charlotte Witt calls gender ‘‘the mega-social role.’’ Witt and 
Haslanger differentiate gender from other features by linking it to re-
production and subordination. So again, I could amend the account, 
this time by stipulating that behaving in ways B1…Bn
 in situations S1…
Sn
 constitutes an extensive and pervasive behavioral repertoire that is 
connected to reproduction and subordination in some way. 
However, I am reluctant to develop my account along those lines. 
For one thing, connecting gender to subordination misrepresents 
any cross-gender identification which is not about wanting to sub-
ordinate or be subordinated. Furthermore, it is difficult to connect 
transgender identity to reproductive role, since a prevalent type of 
transgender, transsexuality, typically involves sacrificing the ability 
to have a biological role in reproduction. For another, being a certain 
gender means different things in different contexts and changes over 
time. I do not want to unduly constrain what gender can be in fu-
ture social contexts. On Haslanger’s view, gender equity would bring 
about the disappearance of ‘‘women’’ from society. On Witt’s view, it 
seems impossible for gender to recede in importance. I do not want 
to rule out the possibility of a social context in which one’s gender is 
an incidental character trait, one that does not serve as a basis for so-
cial stratification. 
So, if it turns out that any cluster of behavioral dispositions can 
count as a gender, and genders aren’t distinguishable from other 
character traits, that might be an acceptable outcome. This is com-
patible with some particular individual’s sense that their own gender 
is very important to their self-image or identity. But being a Nebras-
kan, or a Christian, or a chef, might be very important to someone’s 
identity, too. This account allows for the possibility of a society where 
the centrality of gender for each individual is not effectively mandat-
ed by the norms of that society. 
(d) This dispositional account of gender doesn’t make sense 
of gender dysphoria any better than the other accounts 
mentioned. If a person is acting feminine, they must be 
disposed to act feminine, so they are feminine. If they 
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say ‘‘I’m only acting feminine, but I’m really not’’ neces-
sarily, they are wrong, on this view. That is the wrong 
result. 
First of all, disposition ascriptions do not always work that way. We 
do not count everything that has been broken as fragile, but only 
those that were likely to break by a certain kind of causal process. 
Something can ‘‘mimic’’ having a disposition by exhibiting the man-
ifestation characteristic of that disposition without actually instanti-
ating the disposition.16 
Secondly, if the person mentioned in counterexample is some-
one who is merely acting feminine in a theatrical production or the 
like, they would not have the whole range of sufficiently strong, suf-
ficiently many dispositions mentioned in the account. So, if the coun-
terexample is to be plausible, the person must be someone living and 
passing as a woman. With such a case in mind, I could try to amend 
account to distinguish one’s inherent, true dispositions from oth-
er ‘‘artificial’’ dispositions. In that sense, the person in the exam-
ple would be mimicking someone with a feminine gender identity 
even though he does not in fact have the appropriate range of dispo-
sitions. As with other mimics, there is something deviant about the 
process by which the manifestations are produced, so that the dispo-
sition typically associated with those manifestations is not ascribed 
to the subject. 
However, I am disinclined to pursue this line of response. I do not 
assume that people have a ‘‘true’’ gender that is free from socializa-
tion. People have complex interactions of various behavioral disposi-
tions. They may be disposed to seek social approval, avoid sanctions, 
and so forth. They might also be disposed to exhibit behaviors that 
do not conform to the gender norms that they are subject to. These 
dispositions counteracting each other can result in thwarted desires, 
stress and discomfort. One may feel as though one would not exhib-
it gender conformist behavior if the social cost of doing otherwise 
were not so high. In that case, it seems like a fair characterization of 
one’s situation to say ‘‘I am not really the gender that I am pretend-
ing to be.’’ However, if one is convincingly living one’s life as a wom-
an, there is a sense in which one is feminine to a certain extent. But if 
one has strong dispositions to exhibit non-feminine behaviors, even 
if those dispositions are not manifest, there is also a sense in which 
one has a different gender. 
16 Smith (1977). 
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8 Conclusion 
Whether or not I have successfully addressed these issues, there are 
others that I have not considered here. For one, I have said very lit-
tle about the relationship between gender identity and the body, and 
the complex ways that those factors interact with social role. How-
ever, my aim is to develop an account of gender that is not cisgender, 
but includes transgender experience in the body of phenomena that 
needs to be accommodated, while simultaneously remaining cogni-
zant of social factors. I think a dispositional account of gender is on 
the right track. 
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